Showing 20 results for inauthor:"Jean-Jacques Laffont"

Incentives and Political Economy cover
Political Science2000-03-30

Incentives and Political Economy

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Mainstream economics has only recently recognized the need to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. "Incentives and Political Economy" uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments. It is written by one of Europe's leading theorists. The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed. The second part of the book recognizes the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves a lot of discretion to the politicians selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitution weighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas. The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterize the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institutions in which group behavior is important.

Fundamentals of Public Economics cover
Business & Economics1988

Fundamentals of Public Economics

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Covers a wide variety of public economics issues including general equilibrium analysis and the related issues of market failure, collective decision making and distributional equity. Other topics explored include theories of externalities, public goods, collective choice, consumer surplus, cost-benefit analysis, incomplete markets and nonconvexities.

Regulation and Development cover
Business & Economics2005-03-10

Regulation and Development

Jean-Jacques Laffont

In Regulation and Development Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for developing countries. He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the characteristics of less developed countries (LDCs) and offers a positive theory of privatization that stresses the role of corruption. He develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcement capabilities and discusses the delicate issue of access pricing in view of LDC's specificities. In the final chapter he proposes a theory of separation of powers which reveals one of the many vicious circles of underdevelopment made explicit by the economics of information. Based on organization theory and history, and using simple empirical tests wherever possible, Professor Laffont offers a comprehensive evaluation of the different ways to organize the regulatory institutions and opens up a rich new research agenda for development studies.

The Theory of Incentives cover
Business & Economics2009-12-27

The Theory of Incentives

The Principal-Agent Model

Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort

Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation cover
Business & Economics1993

A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole

Based on their work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach to this field, focusing on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies and transportation authorities.

Essays in the Economics of Uncertainty cover
Business & Economics1980

Essays in the Economics of Uncertainty

Jean-Jacques Laffont

These three elegant essays develop principles central to the understanding of the diverse ways in which imperfect information affects the distribution of resources, incentives, and the evaluation of economic policy. The first concerns the special role that information plays in the allocation process when it is possible to improve accuracy through private investment. The common practice of hiring "experts" whose information is presumably much better than their clients' is analyzed. Issues of cooperative behavior when potential group members possess diverse pieces of information are addressed. Emphasis is placed on the adaptation of the "core" concept from game theory to the resource allocation model with differential information. The second essay deals with the extent to which agents can influence the random events they face. This is known as moral hazard, and in its presence there is a potential inefficiency in the economic system. Two special models are studied: the role of moral hazard in a monetary economy, and the role of an outside adjudicatory agency that has the power to enforce fines and compensation. The final essay discusses the problem of certainty equivalence in economic policy. Conditions under which a full stochastic optimization can be calculated by solving a related, much simpler "certainty equivalence" problem are developed. The reduction in the complexity of calculation involved is very great compared with the potential loss of efficiency.

Competition in Telecommunications cover
Business & Economics2001

Competition in Telecommunications

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole

The authors analyze regulatory reform and the emergence of competitionin network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools ofindustrial organization, political economy, and the economics ofincentives.

Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America cover
Infrastructure (Economics)2005

Infrastructure Concessions in Latin America

Government-led Renegotiations

J. Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont

"The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. They first propose a multiple-period theoretical framework in which both Pareto-improving and rent-shifting renegotiations at the initiative of the government can occur. They then perform an empirical analysis based on a sample of 307 water and transport projects in five Latin American countries between 1989 and 2000. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. The authors provide additional evidence showing that a good regulatory framework is especially important in contexts with weak governance and political opportunism. "--World Bank web site.

Incentives in Public Decision-making cover
Education1979

Incentives in Public Decision-making

Jerry R. Green, Jean-Jacques Laffont

Sets out the basic negative results regarding the possibility of constructing general method. Explores the basic techniques for inducing revelation of individual preferences for collective action and describes the idea shows how it can be ...

Théorie des incitations et réglementationJean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole
Government purchasing2012-12-06

Théorie des incitations et réglementation

Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole

Les vingt dernières années ont vu le rôle de l'État dans le secteur productif considérablement modifié. De producteur ou acteur politique profondément impliqué dans la gestion des entreprises, il est devenu régulateur et pourvoyeur d'incitations. Son nouveau rôle requérait un cadre conceptuel renouvelé pour concevoir les réformes tarifaires, rendre les entreprises plus responsables de leurs coûts, faciliter la concurrence pour ou dans le marché sans exproprier les opérateurs historiques, ou résoudre les problèmes liés au manque d'engagement de l'État et à sa capture éventuelle. Ce livre rend enfin accessible au public francophone les travaux fondateurs de Jean-Jacques Laffont et de Jean Tirole sur la réglementation des industries de réseau et les achats publics. Anticipant sur les réformes structurelles dans les secteurs des télécoms, de l'électricité, du gaz, de la poste ou des transports ferroviaires, ces auteurs avaient anticipé que les théories de I'information et de l'économie industrielle pouvaient offrir; à condition d'être enrichies, un éclairage important sur les choix de réformes et sur leurs limites. Techniquement innovant, ce livre a cependant inspiré les régulateurs sectoriels dans le monde entier ainsi que des générations d 'étudiants en économie industrielle. S'ils sont formulés dans le cadre de la régulation, ses enseignements pour la plupart s 'appliquent plus généralement aux questions incitatives au sein des entreprises, en finance d 'entreprise et en économie du développement.

Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries cover
Infrastructure (Economics)2004

Universal Service Obligations in Developing Countries

Antonio Estache, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Xinzhu Zhang

"Estache, Laffont, and Zhang develop a model to analyze the effects of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments, pricing and network investment. Under discriminatory pricing, asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information. Under uniform pricing, the price is lower but the network is even smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes, not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator. This paper, a product of the Office of the Vice President, Infrastructure Network, is part of a larger effort in the network to promote analytical work on emerging policy issues in infrastructure service delivery"-- World Bank web site.

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